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1 Serial Interval distribution 
The serial interval distribution is the time distribution between symptoms in the index case 
and that of its secondary cases.  To account for the extrinsic period of transmission, it was 
described as a mixture of distributions based on the between bites duration (i.e. the 
gonotrophic cycle) and mortality rate in the mosquito 1. In summary, secondary cases 
infections take place at time given by multiples of the gonotrophic cycle, starting with the 
infecting bite in the mosquito, with a weight decreasing due to mosquito mortality. On the 
basis of viremia time profile, a human host was assumed to be infectious for 5 to 8 days, 
with infectivity starting 1 to 2 days before symptoms. The gonotrophic cycle duration is 
largely determined by temperature (Otero) and is about 4 days in Saint-Martin with 
temperatures in the range around 26°C at this time of the year. This is also in accordance 
with infections in the same households, where about successive cases in the same 
household occurred roughly at multiple of 4 days (Figure S1).  
 
Figure S1 : Observed serial intervals (symptoms to symptoms) in households in Saint-Martin. The first 1-day 
interval may be the result of simultaneous exposition. 
 
To account for the time it takes before the virus is found in the salivary glands of the 
mosquito, we considered that the first gonotrophic cycle after mosquito infection would not 
lead to transmission. The mortality rate of A. aegypti mosquitoes in the Caribbean was 
reported between 0.2 and 0.1 per day in Puerto Rico 2 – we selected 0.1/day. Finally, we only 
considered the first 10 gonotrophic cycles after infection, as few mosquitoes would survive 
more than 40 days (= 10 gonotrophic cycles). Overall, this led to a generation time 
distribution with mean 23 days and SD 6 days (Figure S2). We aggregated the serial interval 
distribution over week-long intervals, with the first interval only 4 days long so that the 
average duration was preserved (i.e. days 0-3, 4-11,…).    
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Figure S2 : Probability density function of the serial interval distribution for chikungunya fever in the 
Caribbean. 
2 Reproduction number estimates in the three French islands 
The reproduction ratio was estimated by the Exponential Growth method, i.e.   
   ∫    (    )  ( )  
 
 
 where g is the probability density function of the serial interval 
distribution and r is the exponential growth rate (see Figure S2). To determine R, we fitted a 
Poisson regression to observed weekly incidence as a function of time and obtained r, then 
applied the transformation above. A large part of the variability in these estimates came 
from the time window selected for analysis, as exemplified in Figure S3. Indeed, the growth 
rate estimate changes and the R estimates are, from left to right, 1.6, 3.6 and 1.4. 
 
Figure S3 : Three instances of exponential growth fitting to the epidemic curve in Saint-Martin, depending on 
the time window considered (from left to right: weeks 1-12, weeks 3-6, weeks 4-10) 
To overcome and illustrate this uncertainty, we reported the estimates obtained on the 10 
periods where the exponential growth provided the best fit. The goodness of fit of the 
exponential growth regression was estimated by the deviance R-squared residual, computed 
as R2 = (Dev(Null) – Dev(Exponential)) / Dev(Null) where Dev(Null) is the deviance of the null 
model computed as Dev(Null) =  ∑      
  
 ̅ 
 and Dev(Exponential) is the deviance of the 
exponential model computed as Dev(Exponential) = =  ∑ (    ̂ )       
  
 ̂ 
  with  ̂  the 
fitted Poisson prediction. The results of this approach can be found in Table S1.  
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Sensitivity analyses were performed regarding the choice of the serial interval distribution. 
Using a shorter duration for the gonotrophic cycle (3 days vs. 4 days), led to little change in 
the serial interval distribution (2 days) and less than 5% variation on the estimates of R. With 
higher daily mortality in mosquitoes (15% instead of 10%), the generation interval was 
shorter, and the estimates of R were reduced by ~20%. 
Table S1: Estimates of the reproduction number R in the 3 French islands according to the choice of period for 
analysis. 
Territory R 
CI95% 
(lo,up) 
Deviance 
R2 
begin end 
Guadeloupe       
 4,2 3,8 4,6 0,99 2014-06 2014-10 
 4,5 4 5,1 0,99 2014-07 2014-10 
 4,1 3,5 4,8 0,97 2014-06 2014-09 
 3,4 3,1 3,6 0,96 2014-06 2014-11 
 3 2,9 3,2 0,95 2014-05 2014-11 
 3,3 3 3,6 0,94 2014-07 2014-11 
 2,8 2,7 3 0,94 2014-04 2014-11 
 3,4 3,1 3,7 0,93 2014-05 2014-10 
 3 2,8 3,2 0,91 2014-04 2014-10 
 3,1 2,8 3,5 0,9 2014-08 2014-11 
Martinique       
 2,5 2,3 2,6 0,99 2014-01 2014-06 
 2,3 2,1 2,5 0,99 2014-01 2014-05 
 2,7 2,4 3 0,99 2014-03 2014-06 
 2,5 2,3 2,7 0,99 2014-02 2014-06 
 2,3 2 2,7 0,98 2014-02 2014-05 
 2,4 2 2,7 0,98 2014-01 2014-04 
 2,2 2,1 2,3 0,96 2014-01 2014-07 
 1,8 1,8 1,9 0,96 2014-01 2014-12 
 1,7 1,7 1,8 0,96 2014-01 2014-14 
 1,7 1,7 1,7 0,96 2014-02 2014-14 
Saint-Martin       
 4 3,4 4,8 0,89 2013-48 2014-01 
 3,4 2,8 4,2 0,87 2013-49 2014-01 
 4 3,1 5,1 0,86 2013-50 2014-01 
 3,7 2,9 4,7 0,76 2013-48 2013-52 
 1,6 1,5 1,6 0,72 2013-48 2014-09 
 2,1 2 2,3 0,72 2013-48 2014-04 
 1,5 1,5 1,6 0,72 2013-49 2014-09 
 2,4 2,1 2,6 0,7 2013-48 2014-03 
 1,9 1,7 2,1 0,68 2013-49 2014-04 
 1,8 1,6 2,1 0,68 2014-05 2014-09 
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3 Model for a fully observed epidemic in the Caribbean  
Data for the analysis of the spatial expansion of the chikungunya epidemic in the Caribbean 
are presented in Table S2. 
Let’s first assume that both the invasion status of territories and the times of invasion are 
known (we will show in the following section how to handle uncertainty about these 
variables). 
We denote T the time when the analysis is done. We denote 1iI  if territory i is invaded; 
and 0iI  otherwise. The time of invasion of territory i is denoted it . By convention, it T
if a territory has not yet been infected at time T.  
We denote 
i j the instantaneous risk of transmission from territory i to territory j as 
defined in Table 1. 
The force of invasion exerted on territory j at time t is: 
 
: i
j i j
i t t
t 

   
The contribution of territory j to the likelihood is 
 
    
  
0
0
.exp if 1
, t |
exp otherwise
j
j
t
j j j j
j j t
j
t u du I
P I
u du

   

 
  



  
The likelihood is: 
       0, | .exp
jj tI
j j j j jj
j
P I t t u du       (1) 
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Table S2 : Dates of publication of reports about the epidemiological situation in territories and source of information 
Territory Date Source 
Territories with local transmission 
Saint-Martin 9/12/13 Local health authorities. 
http://www.invs.sante.fr/fr/content/download/81267/296431/version/43/file/pe_chikungunya_antilles_111213.pdf 
Martinique 19/12/13 Local health authorities. 
http://www.invs.sante.fr/fr/content/download/81629/297952/version/44/file/pe_chikungunya_antilles_191213.pdf 
In a communication to promed (20140129.2240929) a suspect case was described as early as 2/11/13. 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2240929 
Guadeloupe 28/12/13 Local halth authorities. 
http://www.invs.sante.fr/fr/content/download/81802/298759/version/45/file/pe_chikungunya_antilles_261213.pdf 
Saint-Barthelemy 28/12/13 Local health authorities. 
http://www.invs.sante.fr/fr/content/download/81802/298759/version/45/file/pe_chikungunya_antilles_261213.pdf 
British Virgin Islands 13/1/14 Promed Mailing list (20140114.2172714) 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2172714 
Dominica 16/1/14 Promed Mailing List (20140118.2181292 , 20140129.2240929) 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2181292 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2240929 
Anguilla 7/2/14 Promed Mailing list. (20140207.2262952, 20140212.2273650)  
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2262952 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2273650 
French Guiana 18/2/14 Local Health authorities. 
http://www.invs.sante.fr/fr/content/download/84707/310791/version/54/file/pe_chikungunya_antilles_200214.pdf 
Promed mailing list (20140220.2290880) 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2290880 
Saint Kitts & Nevis 20/2/14 Promed mailing list (20140220.2290880) 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2290880 
Dominican Republic 25/3/2014 Promed mailing list (20140420. 2371161) 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2371161 
Saint-Lucia 13/5/14 Promed Mailing List (20140513.2467601) 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2384972 
Note earlier reports of suspect cases without confirmation in January 2014 (20140129.2240929, 20140316.2335886) 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2240929; http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2335886 
Cuba 11/6/14 Promed maling list(20140614.2539532) 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2539532 
US Virgin Islands 11/6/14 Promed maling list(20140614.2539532) 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2539532 
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Territories with confirmed importation but no reported local transmission  
 
Aruba 24/1/14 Promed Mailing List (20140205.2257138) 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2257138 
   
Territories with suspect –not confirmed – cases 
   
Mexico 28/2/14 Promed mailing list (20140302.2309812) 
http://www.promedmail.org/direct.php?id=2309812 
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4 Model for an imperfectly observed epidemic in the Caribbean 
In practice, invasion statuses are imperfectly observed. Times of invasion are unobserved 
and there is a delay between invasion and detection. We develop here a data augmentation 
strategy3-5 to tackle these problems. 
Denote di the (observed time) of the first report indicating that territory i is affected. Let’s 
assume that delay between invasion and reporting is Exponentially distributed with a mean 
delay of m days 
 j jd t Exp m  
 Likelihood of complete data 
If the invasion status i iI , the times of invasion  i it  and of reporting  i id  were available, 
the likelihood of such complete dataset would be: 
       
: 1
, , | , | . | , ,
j
j j j j j j j jj j
j I
P I t d P I t P d I t  

   (2) 
The first term on the right hand side of equation (2) corresponds to the likelihood of the 
invasion process, which is given in equation (1).  
The second term corresponds to the likelihood of the reporting process. For a territory that 
has been invaded, it is equal to  
 
 
 : 1
1
exp if territory  was reported as being affected
| 1, ,
exp otherwise
j
j j
j j j
j I
j
d t
j
m m
P d I t
T t
m


  
  
   
  
 
   
  

 
 Inference in a context of incomplete data 
In practice, the exact time of invasion tj is unobserved and the invasion status Ij is 
imperfectly observed. We have the following relationships: 
- For a territory j that has been reported as being affected, the invasion status is 
known (Ij=1). Besides, the time tj of invasion satisfies the constraint: tj<dj. 
- For a territory j that has not been reported as being affected, we could be in one of 
the following situations: 
o The territory was not invaded:  Ij=0, tj=T. 
o The territory has already been invaded, but has not been reported yet: Ij=1, tj<T, 
dj≥T. 
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To tackle the problem of inference in this context of missing data, we implement a standard 
Bayesian data augmentation strategy 6. Observed data consisting of the times of reporting 
 i id are augmented with the (imperfectly observed) invasion status  i iI and the 
(unobserved) times of invasion i it . The likelihood of the augmented data is given in 
equation (2). 
We then develop a Reversible Jump Markov chain Monte Carlo strategy to explore the joint 
posterior distribution of parameters and augmented data 3, 4, 7. The algorithm allows the 
following steps: 
- Update of the parameters with a standard Metropolis-Hastings step; 
- For territories that were invaded (Ij=1), update of the time of invasion with a 
standard Metropolis-Hastings step; 
- For territories that were not reported as being affected, Reversible Jump steps 
were developed to jump between one of these two options: 
o The territory was not invaded (Ij=0); 
o The territory was invaded (Ij=1, tj<T) but was not reported.  
 Measure of goodness of fit 
We measured goodness of fit by assessing how well the models agreed with the set of 
territories officially affected up to the time of analysis. To that end, for each model k, we 
simulated 10,000 epidemics up to the time of analysis under the sole assumption that the 
epidemic was seeded in Saint-Martin. We then computed the predicted probability of 
territory i being officially affected up to the time of analysis. Our measure of goodness of fit 
was the log-likelihood for the set of territories officially affected   
         .log 1 .log 1k k kTOA i i i i
i
LL I p I p     
where Ii=1 if the territory was officially affected; Ii=0 otherwise. The larger LLTOA, the better 
the fit.  
5 Results and sensitivity analysis  
 Model comparison and impact of reporting delays 
In our baseline scenario, we assume that the mean reporting delay is equal to 30 days. In a 
sensitivity analysis, we also consider a mean reporting delay of 0 and 15 days. We were 
confronted with convergence issues in the MCMC when the mean reporting delay was 
assumed to be 60 days. 
Table S3 shows the measure of goodness of fit LLTOA for the different models and the 
different reporting delays. Overall, the fit does not appear to be much affected by 
assumptions about delay and the ordering of models remains unchanged. 
 k
ip
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Figure S4 presents the monthly probability of transmission as a function of distance between 
territories and for different reporting delays. The spatial kernel remains robust to a change 
in the reporting delay with transmission estimated to be only slightly more localized when 
the assumed reporting delay increases. Increasing the mean reporting delay increases the 
chance that a territory is already invaded or will be invaded soon but does not change the 
relative ordering of territories by risk of invasion (Figures S5). 
 
Table S3: Summary of the models used to study the determinants of regional spread. The covariates being 
considered to model the risk of transmission from territory i to territory j include: passenger flows (Tij) or 
distance (Dij) between the territories, population size of the origin territory (Pi) or of the destination territory 
(Pj). We also provide a measure of goodness of fit (LLTOA) that indicates how well the model can explain the set 
of territories that have been officially affected as of 15 June 2014 (see section 4.3). The larger LLTOA, the better 
the fit. The table presents LLTOA for different values of the assumed average reporting delay (0, 15 and 30 
days). Our baseline scenario corresponds to a reporting delay of 30 days.  
Model name Instantaneous risk of transmission 
 from territory i to territory j  
LLTOA 
  
0 days 15 days 
30 days 
(baseline) 
Model 0  
(null) 
 -26,52 -26,9 -27,28 
Model 1  
(origin pop.)  
-26,15 -25,9 -25,77 
Model 2 
(destination pop.)  -26,92 -27,44 -27,82 
Model 3  
(air transportation)  -41,08 -40,09 -38,7 
Model 4  
(distance)  -16,98 -16,79 -16,07 
Model 5  
(distance + origin pop.)  -18,13 -17,69 -16,79 
Model 6  
(distance + destination pop.)  -17,03 -16,57 -15,83 
Model 7  
(gravity: distance + origin 
pop. + destination pop.) 
 -18,56 -18 -16,66 
 
i j
i j  
 .i j iP

  
 .i j jP

  
 .i j ijT

  
 .i j ijD

  
   . .i j ij iD P
 
  
   . .i j ij jD P
 
  
     . . .i j ij i jD P P
 
  
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Figure S4: Monthly probability of transmission as a function of distance between territories and for different 
reporting delays. 
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Figure S5: Predicted probability of invasion by 30 August 2014 with data available as of 15 June 2014, as a 
function of the mean reporting delay. In our baseline scenario, the reporting delay is assumed to be 30 days. 
 Estimates over time  
Table S4 presents the fits of the null model, the distance model and the air transportation 
model at different times of the epidemic. It shows that throughout the epidemic, the 
distance model was preferred to both the null and the air transportation model. 
  
0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7
Mexico
Guatemala
Costa Rica
Belize
El Salvador
Panama
Honduras
Nicaragua
Colombia
Florida
Guyana
Suriname
Cayman Islands
Jamaica
Bahamas
Venezuela
Turks and Caicos Islands
Aruba
Curacao
Netherlands Antilles
Trinidad and Tobago
Puerto Rico
Barbados
Grenada
Probability of invasion by 30 August 2014 
30 days
15 days
0 day
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Table S4: Measures of goodness of fit (LLTOA) for the null, the distance and the air transportation model with 
data available at different times in the epidemic. The larger LLTOA, the better the fit. The table presents LLTOA 
for different values of the assumed average reporting delay (0, 15 and 30 days). Our baseline scenario 
corresponds to a reporting delay of 30 days. 
  0 day reporting delay 15 day reporting delay 30 day reporting delay 
  Null  Distance  Air transp. Null  Distance  Air transp. Null  Distance  Air transp. 
15/01/2014 -18,64 -13,16 -22,68 -17,66 -11,67 -20,86 -15,85 -10,02 -21,56 
15/02/2014 -18,2 -10,85 -33,48 -17,66 -10,13 -34,77 -17,67 -9,15 -30,84 
15/03/2014 -20,11 -13,07 -49,2 -19,89 -12,7 -48,93 -19,82 -12,03 -43,71 
15/04/2014 -21,08 -14,59 -41,88 -21,17 -14,11 -41,44 -21,29 -13,83 -37,25 
15/05/2014 -24,8 -16,42 -43,66 -24,9 -15,96 -43,12 -25,23 -15,38 -39,96 
15/06/2014 -26,52 -16,98 -41,08 -26,9 -16,79 -40,09 -27,28 -16,07 -38,7 
  
 
Figure S6 presents the estimated transmission kernel at different time points of the 
epidemic. Earlier estimates favoured slightly more short range transmission when compared 
with later estimates. 
 
 
Figure S6: Monthly probability of transmission as a function of distance between territories estimated at 
different times in the epidemic. 
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